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The Four Cardinal Virtues
In The Four Cardinal Virtues, Josef Pieper delivers a stimulating quartet of essays on the four cardinal virtues. He demonstrates the unsound overvaluation of moderation that has made contemporary morality a hollow convention and points out the true significance of the Christian virtues.
Translations originally published as three books: Fortitude and Temperance translated by Daniel F. Coogan (1954); Justice translated by Lawrence E. Lynch (1955); and Prudence translated by Richard and Clara Winston (1959).
Translations originally published as three books: Fortitude and Temperance translated by Daniel F. Coogan (1954); Justice translated by Lawrence E. Lynch (1955); and Prudence translated by Richard and Clara Winston (1959).
208 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 1959
About the author
Josef Pieper
129 books257 followersJosef Pieper was a German Catholic philosopher and an important figure in the resurgence of interest in the thought of Thomas Aquinas in early-to-mid 20th-century philosophy. Among his most notable works are The Four Cardinal Virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance; Leisure, the Basis of Culture; and Guide to Thomas Aquinas (published in England as Introduction to Thomas Aquinas).
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Displaying 1 - 30 of 36 reviews
September 20, 2011
This is one of those books I will go back to again and again. It takes concentration to read, but is so worth it. The part on temperance is especially powerful.
Highly recommended.
Highly recommended.
November 2, 2014
This book was a significant resource for me as I crafted a series of podcast episodes on the virtues to a college audience. It was a great blessing for me to come across this book, since it anchored my own reflections with such challenging depth. Pieper does a great service to his reader by not only articulating the basic definitions of virtue, but then situating them within a wider understanding of the human person and human activity that frequently imposes need to set the book down and meditate. Pieper encountered the clash of the Christian worldview with competing ideologies in the 20th century, and saw what was truly at stake: he understood that something was in danger of being irrevocably lost, something that he valued enormously because it was enormously valuable. The Christian ethical and moral foundations of civilization are truly precious, and Pieper has done something wonderful in presenting these virtues in a format that allows their glorious beauty to shine through their periodically arid formulations.
March 28, 2008
This book contains four separate sections, one on each of the cardinal virtues. In each of these, Pieper takes a look at the virtue as defined, or often mis-defined by the contemporary world and he contrasts this with how the Church in general and St. Thomas in particular understand that given virtue. What emerges is a picture of true humanity. Often what the world offers us is appealing but insufficient, God calls us to go deeper and strive to reach higher, and in return He promises us true joy. This is a challenging but rewarding read. The insights it provides leave much to ponder as to how we can truly begin to live more richly in God's plan for us.
September 22, 2019
While camping with my wife in Oregon I finally finished this classic work. Pieper addresses the four classic, constitutional, crucial or cardinal virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance. As he unpacks each virtue the author channels Thomas Aquinas (and some Augustine). And yet he doesn’t simply parrot this Medieval theologian. He takes up what Aquinas gives, works with it, and adds his own thoughtful flavor to the dish.
Though Pieper was a Catholic thinker, and the material assumes some perspectives from that tradition, nevertheless, it is accessible to Protestants as well. There are insights aplenty that will catch readers a bit off guard. Whether he is tackling Jesus’ words about turning the other cheek, social justice, virginity, sensuality, casuistry or severe asceticism, Pieper surfaces in places one could not foresee. And the forthrightness of his observations and assertions is refreshing. Such as when he sees that prudence and magnanimity have deep affiliations, while insidiousness, “guile, craft, and concupicence are the refuge of small-minded and small-souled persons” (20). My copy of this valuable volume is marked, page after page, with highlights and notes. This is a book I will return to repeatedly!
For those who are unfamiliar with the cardinal virtues, this is an excellent manuscript to become familiar with them. In many places it will set you back in your chair and give you pause. In other spots you will find yourself saying, “Yes! Exactly!” In a day and era where so many social values are being flattened and made pallid, this volume is a refreshingly thoughtful set of insights that the reader will benefit from immensely. I highly recommend the book.
Though Pieper was a Catholic thinker, and the material assumes some perspectives from that tradition, nevertheless, it is accessible to Protestants as well. There are insights aplenty that will catch readers a bit off guard. Whether he is tackling Jesus’ words about turning the other cheek, social justice, virginity, sensuality, casuistry or severe asceticism, Pieper surfaces in places one could not foresee. And the forthrightness of his observations and assertions is refreshing. Such as when he sees that prudence and magnanimity have deep affiliations, while insidiousness, “guile, craft, and concupicence are the refuge of small-minded and small-souled persons” (20). My copy of this valuable volume is marked, page after page, with highlights and notes. This is a book I will return to repeatedly!
For those who are unfamiliar with the cardinal virtues, this is an excellent manuscript to become familiar with them. In many places it will set you back in your chair and give you pause. In other spots you will find yourself saying, “Yes! Exactly!” In a day and era where so many social values are being flattened and made pallid, this volume is a refreshingly thoughtful set of insights that the reader will benefit from immensely. I highly recommend the book.
December 30, 2011
This book is a must read for any Christian who wants to grow in holiness. We often neglect the concept of virtue. Many have not heard of the four cardinal virtues: Prudence (right judgment), Justice (giving the other what is due to them, most specifically due to them as human persons), Fortitude (the strength to do the good), and Temperance (keeping the natural desires of man in right propriety, displaying the real beauty of keeping oneself in line with reality). When developed and lived these Cardinal virtues will help us on our journey of sanctification and the living out of the Gospel in our lives.
August 2, 2011
This book is like a steady diet of steamed vegetables, jogging, and doctors visits. It's a lot of work to get through, but it's a tremendous spiritual workout and helps draw many complex theological ideas together. A confessor had me read it for a penance, and that's really the perfect analogy for the book.
July 22, 2008
This book is one of those that was not read in one or two or even 20 sittings ! It takes thoughtful time ... but is so well worth the patient biting off the pieces and chewing slowly ! There is so much to be gleaned.
April 25, 2022
One of the best books I’ve ever read. Pieper’s clarity and breadth are amazing. I’ll be returning to this for the rest of my life.
December 1, 2017
In his book The Four Cardinal Virtues, Josef Pieper lays a critical foundation for the understanding of the cardinal virtues as seen through the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Pieper lays out very directly where he is going in his Thomistic explanation of the cardinal virtues and the moral life. In his treatise of prudence, for example, Pieper explains the primacy of prudence in relation to the moral virtues and the ethics of man. Prudence has to be primary because that is what the moral life (and subsequently prudence) is all about – doing the good. Pieper not only shows that prudence disposes practical reason to discern the true good in every circumstance and to choose the right means of achieving it, but that all good is prudent; and therefore that all virtue is necessary prudent (p. 5). His logical display of all virtue as prudent is logically followed by the proposition that all vice and sin is thus imprudent.
Pieper’s demonstration of the virtues of prudence is helpful in further understanding Aquinas and the moral life. Pieper does so by clearly demonstrating the relationship of the virtues of prudence: memory, solaria, and a sort of providential foresightedness working intertwined together with the will. This, naturally, for Pieper is ontologically how the growth of the virtue of prudence in Aquinas is brought about (p. 14-17). This is further illumined with the vices of prudence. Pieper demonstrates that for Aquinas first and foremost there is a type of imprudence where something is lacking in the quality of a particular act. He shows how Aquinas discovers that these acts have their origin in unchastity – surrendering to the power of the goods of the sensual world, which splits decision making in two (p.19). This will make even more sense in Pieper’s treatment on temperance. Pieper then goes on to state that cunning (astutia) is the most characteristic form of false prudence in the human person. Thus the proposition that there cannot be any false or crooked ways leading to the proper end goal; that, for Aquinas, not only the end of acts have to be in accord with truth but the means as well. Thus reason, formed by the reality of the truth, must not be blocked by cunning in the means to getting to true and proper ends.
And so, for Aquinas the role of prudence in the moral life cannot be over emphasized. For it is prudence alone, according to Aquinas, which Pieper says is in accord with reason (p. 24). An example that Pieper gives from Aquinas to help demonstrate this is to imagine a man who is temperate in his sensual appetite and yet does not have prudence in his reason, then the temperance, de facto, would fail to be a virtue. This idea further shows the primacy and foundation of prudence in the thought of Aquinas. Thus whatever we do, prudence is the virtue of doing an act well or rightly, or as Aquinas says, the right reason of doing (p. 29).
There is more one could say on the role of prudence in the thought of Aquinas, especially the relationship concerning supernatural prudence, that is, prudence affected by grace and the theological virtue of charity. This would require a further treatise on charity and the supernatural life. Suffice it to say, even supreme supernatural prudence, according to Aquinas, can only have the following aim: to make the more deeply felt truth of the reality of God and world the measure for our will and action (p. 40). According to the scriptures, the man who acts in truth acts in light (Jn 3:21).
As Pieper moves along the hierarchy of moral virtues, he and Aquinas come to justice next. Simply speaking, justice is the habit to give to God and to man what is his due. But it follows that if one presupposes that man is to give to others their due, it means that man by his nature has things that are in fact due him. In the moral and social realm we call these rights. Thus the interplay of justice and rights. Pieper does a good job here of laying out the foundational principle that rights come before justice (p. 45). It is through creation and that the created being first comes to have rights. The right to life and all that surrounds it is our basic human right and it is receiving them that establishes justice. These rights are inalienable. Man has inalienable rights because, again, he is a created person by the act of God.
Pieper shows further how justice can only be discussed meaningfully if it is regarded in the context of a complete moral doctrine. Justice is one feature in what he calls in Aquinas the “sevenfold image of man.” The part of justice only becomes clear within the context of the whole. That as a part of man, justice is arranged toward the good, toward the other, it directs man in his relationship with others (p. 54). Justice, simply speaking, deals with living with others (p. 56). Thus just as only the prudent man can be virtuous in relation to himself and others, so too can only the just man acquire the prudence to live bravely and temperately in the world for the common good of all.
This leads Pieper to unpack the various relationships of justice as found in Aquinas. There is a broader meaning of justice: that it is just to do the good for the sake of the common good. This is known as legal or general justice. For Pieper this is a salient insight because justice thus cannot be on the same level as fortitude or temperance (p. 59). And since justice exists because of objective truth, the mean of justice consists in a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the external person (p. 63). Thus the good of reason shines more brightly in justice than in and of the other moral virtues; justice is closer to reason. Indeed, the good of reason consists in justice as its proper effect – giving further insight to justice’s relations to prudence and the moral life (p. 66-7¬). For it is not enough for us to do the just thing but to be just. Here we see the elucidating of being over doing, and a more complete truth of the moral and virtuous life.
Justice is said to rule in a community (state) when these three fundamental relationships are disposed in their proper order: the relations of individuals to one another (communicative justice); the relations of the social whole to individuals (distributive justice); and the relations of individuals to the social whole (legal justice). The brilliance in the way Pieper shows the interrelationship and depth of all these kinds of justice is the ability to see the depth of meaning in things. We see how we human being are configured towards right order and that when we damage and destroy this order, such as by committing an injustice, we not only damage others but counterintuitively harm ourselves even more.
Fortitude and temperance are, in a sense for Pieper, the practical living out of the moral life in the world by the prudent and just man (p. 125). To be brave, for Pieper, is at its heart not only of battle, but of martyrdom. It is fortitude that gives one the strength to die for the faith. Consequently, as Pieper observes, it is often forgotten in this day and age as a virtue, fortitude carries with it a positive relationship to (just) anger (p. 130). This is the passion that motivates a person to the willingness to attack evil and is thus a virtue.
Temperance is the fourth virtue. Today, temperance is associated with bodily pleasures, but the classic view of temperance included spiritual temperance as well, such as the virtue that regulates the desire for knowledge being studiositas as compared to the pathological need for sense perception which is the vice of curiositas (p. 198 - 199). It is a worthwhile exercise to read the section on temperance to see how moderate Aquinas is when it recognizes that virtue is the means between two antipodal vices. Even a disordered turning toward the goods (e.g. sensuality) of the world is not necessarily a mortal sin if it does not involve a turning away from God (p. 173). Even fasting can be a sin if done to strenuously because it is against reason to overtax nature (p. 183). To the Moderns of Pieper’s day, who can only imagine an either/or world – either all sexual activity is good or we face a world of totalitarian repression by a Puritanical-Jansenist-quasi-Manichean world view – would benefit from seeing the nuance that comes from looking at the world as if it had three dimensions. This as opposed to two, with two being polar extremes and the third being a large area lying near the mean between the extremes, as Pieper does. Pieper helps us to see that virtue and the moral life is not primarily about the knowing but is about “being,” understanding and choosing according to a reality of God who exists outside ourselves.
Personal Reflection
I think Pieper gives a good and an overall accessible read into the world view of Aquinas. This is brought about, no doubt, from Pieper’s long study, contemplation, and life experience. It is the kind of book on virtue which I would wish to write myself. It is a marvelous compendium of ancient truth, which will reward greater study.
After reading it I of course have a better sense of the cardinal virtues, but especially of how Aquinas sees them contextually. How he sees them fitting together so nuanced that they all relate to the others in such a way that it really does make one see the whole picture of the human person. I found prudence especially true in this regard. I had always taught my students in the past that prudence is the form of all the moral virtues, that it’s the charioteer of all the other moral virtues. But after reading Pieper I see more clearly how it is the preeminent virtue, how it is truly fixed on reality, the reality of God and his relation to the whole human person. I really appreciate how he helped show me so clearly the true nature of the virtues and how he distinguishes them from the counterfeit virtues which society labels by the same name. I am struck by how particularly good Pieper is at showing how counterfeits of these virtues are in fact Manicheaistic in nature, often showing disdain of the body, etc. An example is when he cites Aquinas as saying that in paradise the pleasure which man derived from the sexual act would have been greater rather than impaired by an over-spiritualism.
Pieper’s work does bring up questions about the role of grace and the moral virtues. While he does touch on this to some extent, it seems his work on grace and the theological virtues from his book of the same name, which I’ve read sections of in my undergrad days, is a necessary companion to his work on the cardinal virtues for one to get a full view of Christian ethics and the moral life, etc. His work also raises further questions on what role mystery and mysticism plays in the moral life, answers which can be found, I know, in his works on contemplation. Also, I did think his chapter on distributive justice is a bit dense and over extended. One could tell that it is clearly written as a response to modern Communism and Marxism. His chapter on chastity is also clearly written, and rightfully so, over and against casuistry. It would be interesting to see how Pieper would rewrite them for today’s world views on society and the human person. Perhaps this will be my task in and for the future.
Pieper’s demonstration of the virtues of prudence is helpful in further understanding Aquinas and the moral life. Pieper does so by clearly demonstrating the relationship of the virtues of prudence: memory, solaria, and a sort of providential foresightedness working intertwined together with the will. This, naturally, for Pieper is ontologically how the growth of the virtue of prudence in Aquinas is brought about (p. 14-17). This is further illumined with the vices of prudence. Pieper demonstrates that for Aquinas first and foremost there is a type of imprudence where something is lacking in the quality of a particular act. He shows how Aquinas discovers that these acts have their origin in unchastity – surrendering to the power of the goods of the sensual world, which splits decision making in two (p.19). This will make even more sense in Pieper’s treatment on temperance. Pieper then goes on to state that cunning (astutia) is the most characteristic form of false prudence in the human person. Thus the proposition that there cannot be any false or crooked ways leading to the proper end goal; that, for Aquinas, not only the end of acts have to be in accord with truth but the means as well. Thus reason, formed by the reality of the truth, must not be blocked by cunning in the means to getting to true and proper ends.
And so, for Aquinas the role of prudence in the moral life cannot be over emphasized. For it is prudence alone, according to Aquinas, which Pieper says is in accord with reason (p. 24). An example that Pieper gives from Aquinas to help demonstrate this is to imagine a man who is temperate in his sensual appetite and yet does not have prudence in his reason, then the temperance, de facto, would fail to be a virtue. This idea further shows the primacy and foundation of prudence in the thought of Aquinas. Thus whatever we do, prudence is the virtue of doing an act well or rightly, or as Aquinas says, the right reason of doing (p. 29).
There is more one could say on the role of prudence in the thought of Aquinas, especially the relationship concerning supernatural prudence, that is, prudence affected by grace and the theological virtue of charity. This would require a further treatise on charity and the supernatural life. Suffice it to say, even supreme supernatural prudence, according to Aquinas, can only have the following aim: to make the more deeply felt truth of the reality of God and world the measure for our will and action (p. 40). According to the scriptures, the man who acts in truth acts in light (Jn 3:21).
As Pieper moves along the hierarchy of moral virtues, he and Aquinas come to justice next. Simply speaking, justice is the habit to give to God and to man what is his due. But it follows that if one presupposes that man is to give to others their due, it means that man by his nature has things that are in fact due him. In the moral and social realm we call these rights. Thus the interplay of justice and rights. Pieper does a good job here of laying out the foundational principle that rights come before justice (p. 45). It is through creation and that the created being first comes to have rights. The right to life and all that surrounds it is our basic human right and it is receiving them that establishes justice. These rights are inalienable. Man has inalienable rights because, again, he is a created person by the act of God.
Pieper shows further how justice can only be discussed meaningfully if it is regarded in the context of a complete moral doctrine. Justice is one feature in what he calls in Aquinas the “sevenfold image of man.” The part of justice only becomes clear within the context of the whole. That as a part of man, justice is arranged toward the good, toward the other, it directs man in his relationship with others (p. 54). Justice, simply speaking, deals with living with others (p. 56). Thus just as only the prudent man can be virtuous in relation to himself and others, so too can only the just man acquire the prudence to live bravely and temperately in the world for the common good of all.
This leads Pieper to unpack the various relationships of justice as found in Aquinas. There is a broader meaning of justice: that it is just to do the good for the sake of the common good. This is known as legal or general justice. For Pieper this is a salient insight because justice thus cannot be on the same level as fortitude or temperance (p. 59). And since justice exists because of objective truth, the mean of justice consists in a certain proportion of equality between the external thing and the external person (p. 63). Thus the good of reason shines more brightly in justice than in and of the other moral virtues; justice is closer to reason. Indeed, the good of reason consists in justice as its proper effect – giving further insight to justice’s relations to prudence and the moral life (p. 66-7¬). For it is not enough for us to do the just thing but to be just. Here we see the elucidating of being over doing, and a more complete truth of the moral and virtuous life.
Justice is said to rule in a community (state) when these three fundamental relationships are disposed in their proper order: the relations of individuals to one another (communicative justice); the relations of the social whole to individuals (distributive justice); and the relations of individuals to the social whole (legal justice). The brilliance in the way Pieper shows the interrelationship and depth of all these kinds of justice is the ability to see the depth of meaning in things. We see how we human being are configured towards right order and that when we damage and destroy this order, such as by committing an injustice, we not only damage others but counterintuitively harm ourselves even more.
Fortitude and temperance are, in a sense for Pieper, the practical living out of the moral life in the world by the prudent and just man (p. 125). To be brave, for Pieper, is at its heart not only of battle, but of martyrdom. It is fortitude that gives one the strength to die for the faith. Consequently, as Pieper observes, it is often forgotten in this day and age as a virtue, fortitude carries with it a positive relationship to (just) anger (p. 130). This is the passion that motivates a person to the willingness to attack evil and is thus a virtue.
Temperance is the fourth virtue. Today, temperance is associated with bodily pleasures, but the classic view of temperance included spiritual temperance as well, such as the virtue that regulates the desire for knowledge being studiositas as compared to the pathological need for sense perception which is the vice of curiositas (p. 198 - 199). It is a worthwhile exercise to read the section on temperance to see how moderate Aquinas is when it recognizes that virtue is the means between two antipodal vices. Even a disordered turning toward the goods (e.g. sensuality) of the world is not necessarily a mortal sin if it does not involve a turning away from God (p. 173). Even fasting can be a sin if done to strenuously because it is against reason to overtax nature (p. 183). To the Moderns of Pieper’s day, who can only imagine an either/or world – either all sexual activity is good or we face a world of totalitarian repression by a Puritanical-Jansenist-quasi-Manichean world view – would benefit from seeing the nuance that comes from looking at the world as if it had three dimensions. This as opposed to two, with two being polar extremes and the third being a large area lying near the mean between the extremes, as Pieper does. Pieper helps us to see that virtue and the moral life is not primarily about the knowing but is about “being,” understanding and choosing according to a reality of God who exists outside ourselves.
Personal Reflection
I think Pieper gives a good and an overall accessible read into the world view of Aquinas. This is brought about, no doubt, from Pieper’s long study, contemplation, and life experience. It is the kind of book on virtue which I would wish to write myself. It is a marvelous compendium of ancient truth, which will reward greater study.
After reading it I of course have a better sense of the cardinal virtues, but especially of how Aquinas sees them contextually. How he sees them fitting together so nuanced that they all relate to the others in such a way that it really does make one see the whole picture of the human person. I found prudence especially true in this regard. I had always taught my students in the past that prudence is the form of all the moral virtues, that it’s the charioteer of all the other moral virtues. But after reading Pieper I see more clearly how it is the preeminent virtue, how it is truly fixed on reality, the reality of God and his relation to the whole human person. I really appreciate how he helped show me so clearly the true nature of the virtues and how he distinguishes them from the counterfeit virtues which society labels by the same name. I am struck by how particularly good Pieper is at showing how counterfeits of these virtues are in fact Manicheaistic in nature, often showing disdain of the body, etc. An example is when he cites Aquinas as saying that in paradise the pleasure which man derived from the sexual act would have been greater rather than impaired by an over-spiritualism.
Pieper’s work does bring up questions about the role of grace and the moral virtues. While he does touch on this to some extent, it seems his work on grace and the theological virtues from his book of the same name, which I’ve read sections of in my undergrad days, is a necessary companion to his work on the cardinal virtues for one to get a full view of Christian ethics and the moral life, etc. His work also raises further questions on what role mystery and mysticism plays in the moral life, answers which can be found, I know, in his works on contemplation. Also, I did think his chapter on distributive justice is a bit dense and over extended. One could tell that it is clearly written as a response to modern Communism and Marxism. His chapter on chastity is also clearly written, and rightfully so, over and against casuistry. It would be interesting to see how Pieper would rewrite them for today’s world views on society and the human person. Perhaps this will be my task in and for the future.
July 12, 2023
(poznámky v procese)
December 12, 2015
"The man who recklessly and indiscriminately courts any kind of danger is not...brave; all he proves is that, without preliminary examination or distinction, he considers all things more valuable than the personal intactness which he risks for their sake. The nature of fortitude is not determined by risking one's person arbitrarily, but only by sacrifice of self in accordance with reason...Genuine fortitude presupposes a correct evaluation of things, of the things that one risks as well as of those which one hopes to preserve or gain by the risk." (p. 124)
"No doubt to die without hope is harder and more fearful than dying in the hope of eternal life. But who would be willing to accept such nonsense as this: that it is braver to enter death without hope? Yet whoever takes not the end but the effort as the good can hardly avoid this nihilistic conclusion. As St. Augustine says, it is not injury that makes the martyr, but the fact that his action is in accordance with truth. What matters is not the ease or the difficulty, but 'the truth of things'. What matters is the reality of eternal life. And the 'rectitude' of hope lies in the fact that it corresponds to this reality." (p. 141)
"The ground of humility is man's estimation of himself according to truth." (p. 189)
"What is meant by high-mindedness or magnanimity? It is the striving of the mind toward great things. High-minded is the man who feels the potentiality of greatness and prepares for it...The high-minded man despises everything small-minded...Fearless frankness is the hallmark of high-mindedness; nothing is further from it than to suppress truth from fear. Flattery and dissimulation are equally removed from the high-minded. The high-minded man does not complain; for his heart is impervious to external evil. High-mindedness implies an unshakable firmness of hope, an actually challenging assurance, and the perfect peace of a fearless heart, The high-minded man bows neither to confusion of the soul, nor to any man, nor to fate - but to God alone." (pp. 189-190)
"Every sin contains two elements: a turning away from God and a turning toward transitory good..." (p. 191)
"Only the combination of the intemperateness of lustfulness with the lazy inertia incapable of generating anger is the sign of complete and virtually hopeless degeneration. It appears whenever a caste, a people, or a whole civilization is ripe for its decline and fall." (p. 197)
"(Man) should hermetically close the inner room of his being against the intrusively boisterous pseudo-reality of empty shows and sounds. It is in such an asceticism of cognition alone that he may preserve or regain that which actually constitutes man's vital existence: the perception of God and His creation, and the possibility of shaping himself and the world according to this truth, which reveals itself only in silence." (p. 202)
"No doubt to die without hope is harder and more fearful than dying in the hope of eternal life. But who would be willing to accept such nonsense as this: that it is braver to enter death without hope? Yet whoever takes not the end but the effort as the good can hardly avoid this nihilistic conclusion. As St. Augustine says, it is not injury that makes the martyr, but the fact that his action is in accordance with truth. What matters is not the ease or the difficulty, but 'the truth of things'. What matters is the reality of eternal life. And the 'rectitude' of hope lies in the fact that it corresponds to this reality." (p. 141)
"The ground of humility is man's estimation of himself according to truth." (p. 189)
"What is meant by high-mindedness or magnanimity? It is the striving of the mind toward great things. High-minded is the man who feels the potentiality of greatness and prepares for it...The high-minded man despises everything small-minded...Fearless frankness is the hallmark of high-mindedness; nothing is further from it than to suppress truth from fear. Flattery and dissimulation are equally removed from the high-minded. The high-minded man does not complain; for his heart is impervious to external evil. High-mindedness implies an unshakable firmness of hope, an actually challenging assurance, and the perfect peace of a fearless heart, The high-minded man bows neither to confusion of the soul, nor to any man, nor to fate - but to God alone." (pp. 189-190)
"Every sin contains two elements: a turning away from God and a turning toward transitory good..." (p. 191)
"Only the combination of the intemperateness of lustfulness with the lazy inertia incapable of generating anger is the sign of complete and virtually hopeless degeneration. It appears whenever a caste, a people, or a whole civilization is ripe for its decline and fall." (p. 197)
"(Man) should hermetically close the inner room of his being against the intrusively boisterous pseudo-reality of empty shows and sounds. It is in such an asceticism of cognition alone that he may preserve or regain that which actually constitutes man's vital existence: the perception of God and His creation, and the possibility of shaping himself and the world according to this truth, which reveals itself only in silence." (p. 202)
Want to read
January 27, 2015Recommended by James Schall in Another Sort of Learning, Intro to Part Three, as one of Fourteen Books by Josef Pieper.
Included in the "Catholicism Explained/Theology" section of Fr. John McCloskey's 100-book Catholic Lifetime Reading Plan.
Included in the "Catholicism Explained/Theology" section of Fr. John McCloskey's 100-book Catholic Lifetime Reading Plan.
August 10, 2018
Virtue has become a buzzy concept in certain circles. In fact, I set myself a goal of finishing this book as a foundation to reading Guroian's "Tending the Heart of Virtue" this year. Pieper does provide an excellent foundation for how to think about virtue in an age of shifting and increasingly demanding moral standards (that are often at odds with each other. In his time, and more so in ours, these four virtues have become empty concepts to us, overly familiar or misunderstood. Prudence, Justice, fortitude, and temperance are clearly defined and discussed in a thought-provoking manner.
One of the distinct differences between Pieper's approach and many other "devotional" books is that Pieper leaves the application to the individual to ponder within the scope of his time and circumstances.
I found this book enlightening and edifying. It will certainly be worth reading again and in conjunction with his treatises on the three theological virtues.
One of the distinct differences between Pieper's approach and many other "devotional" books is that Pieper leaves the application to the individual to ponder within the scope of his time and circumstances.
I found this book enlightening and edifying. It will certainly be worth reading again and in conjunction with his treatises on the three theological virtues.
January 31, 2021
I am not going out on a limb here by saying that this is one of the best books I have read. It is filled with wisdom and sound judgement. Such books are rare and take time to digest.
August 6, 2021
Teko skaityti postmodernistinio amžiaus tekstų apie vertybes, kurios lyg bando pritempti idėja, apie viso gyvenimo vertybes galinčias atvesti į laimingą gyvenimą. Po šios knygos, jos visos netenka prasmės. Tai filosofinis, gilus žvilgsnis į žmogaus gyvenimą ir kaip laikantis dorybių, atsiskleidžia tiesos pažinimas.
Knyga išties kieta ir sunkiai skaitoma, prie vieno sakinio kartais tenka pasedėti ilgeliau. Reikia paminėti, kad knygoje daugiausiai remtasi Šv. Tomo Akviniečio raštais, tad kas nėra susipažinęs su jo filosofija, bus itin sudėtinga skaityti, tačiau bet kokios filosofinės žinios gelbsti. Taip pat vertimas į LT kalbą nėra pats geriausias, daug filosofinių sąvokų gali turėti kitas reikšmes, o lietuvių kalboje nėra tiek daug atitikmenų jom išsakyti.
Knyga išties kieta ir sunkiai skaitoma, prie vieno sakinio kartais tenka pasedėti ilgeliau. Reikia paminėti, kad knygoje daugiausiai remtasi Šv. Tomo Akviniečio raštais, tad kas nėra susipažinęs su jo filosofija, bus itin sudėtinga skaityti, tačiau bet kokios filosofinės žinios gelbsti. Taip pat vertimas į LT kalbą nėra pats geriausias, daug filosofinių sąvokų gali turėti kitas reikšmes, o lietuvių kalboje nėra tiek daug atitikmenų jom išsakyti.
November 7, 2017
Really helpful for understanding the four cardinal virtues from a Christian perspective. Pieper is steeped in Thomas and is a terse writer. He is also Roman Catholic, so the Protestant reader will reject some of his conclusions and arguments, but should still benefit greatly from this book.
Pieper is also a technical writer, so there were a number of spots where I lost track of his argument or simply didn't know what he was talking about. He often includes Latin phrases without translation, so that may be frustrating to some readers.
Pieper is also a technical writer, so there were a number of spots where I lost track of his argument or simply didn't know what he was talking about. He often includes Latin phrases without translation, so that may be frustrating to some readers.
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October 24, 2012I appreciated Pieper's reflections on the four cardinal virtues. Each chapter is richly thoughtful and articulate, fleshing out the virtues in a way that both deepens understanding and challenges one's living.
I used this book, as well as Pieper's book on the three theological virtues (faith, hope, love) as the backbone for a series of sermons on the seven virtues. Throughout the series, I was continually thankful for this resource.
I used this book, as well as Pieper's book on the three theological virtues (faith, hope, love) as the backbone for a series of sermons on the seven virtues. Throughout the series, I was continually thankful for this resource.
January 29, 2016
Pieper unpacks the meaning of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. It's a demanding book--one that demanded my full attention (and sometimes the rereading of an entire page). But it's also rewarding and insightful. I found myself over and over again thinking, "Wow, I've never thought of it like that!"
February 17, 2015
Pieper is always perfect. Just read it.
January 14, 2017
Fantastic book. It honestly transformed my view and understanding of the four cardinal virtues. Definitely recommended - it is a bit of a higher-level read but definitely enjoyable
June 18, 2023
"Prudence as cognition,' as cognition of the concrete situation of concrete action, includes above all the ability to be still in order to attain objective perception of reality.
p. 13
There is no way of grasping the concreteness of a man's ethical decisions from outside. But no, there is a certain way, a single way: that is through the love of friendship. A friend, and a prudent friend, can help to shape a friend's decision. He does so by virtue of that love which makes the friend's problem his own, the friend's ego his own (so that after all it is not entirely "from outside"). For by virtue of that oneness which love can establish he is able to visualize the concrete situation calling for decision, visualize it from, as it were, the actual center of responsibility. Therefore it is possible for a friendonly for a friend and only for a prudent friend-to help with counsel and direction to shape a friend's decision or, somewhat in the manner of a judge, help to reshape it. Such genuine and prudent loving friendship (amor amicitiae)-which has nothing in common with sentimental intimacy, and indeed is rather imperiled by such intimacy-is the sine qua non for genuine spiritual guidance. For only this empowers another to offer the kind of direction which-almost!-conforms to the concrete situation in which the decision must be made.
p. 29
Things are nought only before God, who created them and in whose hand they are as clay in the hand of the potter. By the superhuman force of grace-given love, however, man may become
speak, one with God to such an extent that he receives, so to the capacity and the right to see created things from God's point of view and to "relativize" them and see them as nought from God's point of view, without at the same time repudiating them or doing injustice to their nature. Growth in love is the legitimate avenue and the one and only justification for "contempt for the world."
p. 39
Yet, as has already been said, we need not turn our attention only to compensation for injustice. Man's every act "disturbs" the stable equilibrium, since every act turns the doer into either a debtor or a creditor. And since men are constantly becoming indebted to one another, the demand is constantly raised to pay that debt by an act of "restitution." Therefore, the equality that characterizes justice cannot be finally and definitely established at any one time, it cannot be arrested. It must, rather, be constantly re-established, "restored anew" (iterato). It has to be "reinstated." The "return to equilibrium," which, Thomas says, occurs in restitutio'3s an unending task. This means that the dynamic character finds its image within the of man's communal life very structure of every act of justice. If the basic act of commutative justice is called "restitution," the very word implies that it is never possible for men to realize an ideal and definitive condition. What it means is, rather, that the fundamental condition of man and his world is provisory, temporary, nondefinitive, tentative, as by the "patchwork" character of all historical is proved activity, and ble order that, consequently, any claim to erect a definitive and unalterainhuman.
p. 80
The suffering of injury is only a partial and foreground aspect of fortitude. The brave man suffers injury not for its own sake, but rather as a means to preserve or to acquire a deeper, more essential intactness.
p. 119
The virtue of fortitude has nothing to do with a purely vital, blind, exuberant, daredevil spirit. (On the other hand it presupposes a healthy vitality, perhaps more than any other virtue.) The man who recklessly and indiscriminately courts any kind of danger is not for that reason brave; all he proves is that, without preliminary examination or distinction, he considers all manner of things more valuable, than the personal intactness which he risks for their sake.' The nature of fortitude is not determined by risking one's person arbitrarily, but only by a sacrifice of self in accordance with reason, that is, with the true nature and value of real things. "Not in any way whatsoever, but according to reason." Genuine fortitude prea supposes a correct evaluation of things, of the things that one risks as well as of those which one hopes by the risk.
p. 124
Wherever a "new generation" takes up the attack against the resisting forces of evil or against a tense obsession with a security which clings to the delusion that the disharmony of the world is fundamentally curable by cautious and correct "tactics," it is above all necessary to maintain a lively and vigilant awareness that such fighting can only reach beyond sound and fury if it draws its strongest forces from the fortitude of the mystical life, which dares to submit unconditionally to the governance of God.
p. 140
It is in such an asceticism of cognition alone that he may preserve or regain that which actually constitutes man's vital existence: the perception of the reality of God and His creation, and the possibility of shaping himself and the world according to this truth, which reveals itself only in silence.
p. 202
December 19, 2023
Easily one of the best books I’ve ever read. I’m going to try to summarize the sections very briefly mainly to try to organize my own thoughts a little bit.
1) Prudence—Pieper distinguishes prudence from its typical modern understanding of someone who hems and haws and has a tough time making up their mind (which is not prudence but in many ways its opposite) and also of prudes/prudish people who act in a puritanical way about everything. Rather prudence is a habit gained from logical thinking that allows a person to act properly in whatever situation life throws at him. This also avoids the problem of casuistry, of feeling that to act morally/virtuously one has to study thousands of moral cases. Instead, one has to know the truth and act on it.
2) Justice—the things we owe that can never properly be repaid so we attempt to repay them in extravagance (debt to God, our parents, our country, all concepts foreign or even repulsive to many) and what we owe each other/what we owe those around us. Probably one I should reread soon. He focuses on some specific political theory that I personally don’t have a ton of interest in but is probably very worthwhile.
3) Fortitude—has two basic elements, endurance and attack, or to endure suffering for good and to vigorously pursue good in action. This helps free particularly Christian concepts of fortitude from pacifism (Christ got angry with the moneychangers in the Temple and was in “attack,” was absolutely not pacifistic) and endurance, which is the core of fortitude—namely the capacity to withstand suffering for a higher good (Catholicism can sometimes be perceived as a cult of suffering, when in reality suffering is only beneficial when it is endured for a greater good, again with Christ’s endurance in suffering as the ultimate example, or the martyrs)
4) Temperance—temperance is the ordering of desires to serve the good. This again frees Catholicism from puritanical/Manichein tendencies (such as thinking food or drink or sexual things as “necessary evils”/things to blush about/get embarrassed about) instead of great goods that must nevertheless always be subservient to the higher goods of reason (we have minds that are different than animals, so we have a duty to consider what is just, ethical, etc with regards to even good things like consumption of delicious food). Temperance allows a person to live fully, their whole life/being ordered toward the good, and allows a pureness of heart through which they can truly see and perceive things as they are instead of through a selfish, egotistical lens of someone who only looks to serve their appetites
1) Prudence—Pieper distinguishes prudence from its typical modern understanding of someone who hems and haws and has a tough time making up their mind (which is not prudence but in many ways its opposite) and also of prudes/prudish people who act in a puritanical way about everything. Rather prudence is a habit gained from logical thinking that allows a person to act properly in whatever situation life throws at him. This also avoids the problem of casuistry, of feeling that to act morally/virtuously one has to study thousands of moral cases. Instead, one has to know the truth and act on it.
2) Justice—the things we owe that can never properly be repaid so we attempt to repay them in extravagance (debt to God, our parents, our country, all concepts foreign or even repulsive to many) and what we owe each other/what we owe those around us. Probably one I should reread soon. He focuses on some specific political theory that I personally don’t have a ton of interest in but is probably very worthwhile.
3) Fortitude—has two basic elements, endurance and attack, or to endure suffering for good and to vigorously pursue good in action. This helps free particularly Christian concepts of fortitude from pacifism (Christ got angry with the moneychangers in the Temple and was in “attack,” was absolutely not pacifistic) and endurance, which is the core of fortitude—namely the capacity to withstand suffering for a higher good (Catholicism can sometimes be perceived as a cult of suffering, when in reality suffering is only beneficial when it is endured for a greater good, again with Christ’s endurance in suffering as the ultimate example, or the martyrs)
4) Temperance—temperance is the ordering of desires to serve the good. This again frees Catholicism from puritanical/Manichein tendencies (such as thinking food or drink or sexual things as “necessary evils”/things to blush about/get embarrassed about) instead of great goods that must nevertheless always be subservient to the higher goods of reason (we have minds that are different than animals, so we have a duty to consider what is just, ethical, etc with regards to even good things like consumption of delicious food). Temperance allows a person to live fully, their whole life/being ordered toward the good, and allows a pureness of heart through which they can truly see and perceive things as they are instead of through a selfish, egotistical lens of someone who only looks to serve their appetites
May 17, 2018
Four not-very-practical essays on the four virtues. Sometimes fascinating, sometimes boring. Pieper takes too many pages to define all the many false, excessive and deficient forms of a virtue. He really wants you to be sure what that virtue is, which is nice, but when that means also defining everything that that virtue is NOT then it is boring.
Pieper makes a tiresome fuss about how intellectually poor the moderns are. But Pieper's moderns died decades ago and barbarians have since wrecked academia. I listed off the cardinal virtues to two college students recently. They politely said "That sounds like a lot of work."
The Prudence essay speaks the language of existentialism and realism. It is full of quotable quotes. It is excellent but goes on wayyy too long.
The Justice essay is mostly boring after the brilliant basic idea is developed. Pieper wants to describe every instance of justice. But the book is not an entire philosophy of justice, just an introduction to the virtue. Pieper went overboard here.
I'll be finishing Fortitude tonight. Temperance tomorrow. I'll never re-read. This book sadly has NOTHING practical to teach us. Pieper should have been cut his writing with more prudence and showed more justice in considering his readers. Not as practical as I had hoped. Three stars.
ADDITIONAL NOTES from the next day: Pieper is always concerned with the highest, broadest, most intellectually understanding of the cardinal virtues. Nowhere to be seen is the modern concern with practicality and usefulness. He is concerned only with KNOWING. As such, we should take this book on that proviso: it's not a self-help or guidance manual, but simply a guide to understanding the virtues of the human soul.
Reading temperance it is clear he is reaching for the deepest and most inward expression of the virtue possible. He really wants us to "get it". One cannot doubt his sincerity at least. More notes forthcoming.
MORE NOTES: Finally, the attempt to distinguish between the following cluster of terms is actually fairly fascinating, since we moderns really don't have a clue about them. The cloud of terms are:
Chastity, temperance, continence, purity, modesty, abstinence. All of these except purity appear to be sub-sets of temperance, and purity appears to be a fruit of temperance. (cf - http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3143.htm )
Pieper makes a tiresome fuss about how intellectually poor the moderns are. But Pieper's moderns died decades ago and barbarians have since wrecked academia. I listed off the cardinal virtues to two college students recently. They politely said "That sounds like a lot of work."
The Prudence essay speaks the language of existentialism and realism. It is full of quotable quotes. It is excellent but goes on wayyy too long.
The Justice essay is mostly boring after the brilliant basic idea is developed. Pieper wants to describe every instance of justice. But the book is not an entire philosophy of justice, just an introduction to the virtue. Pieper went overboard here.
I'll be finishing Fortitude tonight. Temperance tomorrow. I'll never re-read. This book sadly has NOTHING practical to teach us. Pieper should have been cut his writing with more prudence and showed more justice in considering his readers. Not as practical as I had hoped. Three stars.
ADDITIONAL NOTES from the next day: Pieper is always concerned with the highest, broadest, most intellectually understanding of the cardinal virtues. Nowhere to be seen is the modern concern with practicality and usefulness. He is concerned only with KNOWING. As such, we should take this book on that proviso: it's not a self-help or guidance manual, but simply a guide to understanding the virtues of the human soul.
Reading temperance it is clear he is reaching for the deepest and most inward expression of the virtue possible. He really wants us to "get it". One cannot doubt his sincerity at least. More notes forthcoming.
MORE NOTES: Finally, the attempt to distinguish between the following cluster of terms is actually fairly fascinating, since we moderns really don't have a clue about them. The cloud of terms are:
Chastity, temperance, continence, purity, modesty, abstinence. All of these except purity appear to be sub-sets of temperance, and purity appears to be a fruit of temperance. (cf - http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3143.htm )
June 26, 2019
A fascinating defense of the cardinal virtues. Drawing heavily from Thomistic thought, Pieper shows that these virtues are grounded in objective good. Thus, prudence, for example, is not just being street smart -- it is realizing the objective good and acting accordingly. One of the most helpful ideas that Pieper taught me is that the post-enlightenment understanding of reason is flawed. Contemporary philosophers and psychologists (Haidt, for example) will pit reason against emotions, seeing reason as a stoic decision-maker based on the intellect over and above one's emotions. Unfortunately, this is anachronistic, for it redefines what Aquinas and other classical thinkers thought of as "reason." Pieper shows that what classical thinkers thought of as "reason" is recognizing what Fr. Schall calls "the order of things," that is, recognizing one's place and one's actions and how they function within God's cosmos. Simply put, reason is seeing the world as it is.
The book is a little dense for those unfamiliar with Thomistic thought (I recommend reading Feser's introduction to Aquinas first), but for those who are familiar, Pieper's book is a helpful clarification of Aquinas' ethics.
The book is a little dense for those unfamiliar with Thomistic thought (I recommend reading Feser's introduction to Aquinas first), but for those who are familiar, Pieper's book is a helpful clarification of Aquinas' ethics.
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July 6, 2019Esta obra se pueden encontrar, tanto en alemán, como en las traducciones a diversos idiomas, en libros separados sobre cada virtud, o en un solo volumen. En conjunto presentan una explicación muy sugerente de los aspectos principales de las virtudes teologales y morales, y abre horizontes ayudando a descubrir la profundidad y coherencia de la vida cristiana. Sigue a Santo Tomás, aunque a veces con interpretaciones personales no compartidas por otros buenos autores tomistas. Lectura muy útil para personas con cierta formación. Estilo ágil.
December 30, 2017
Estamos ante un libro que recoge varias monografías sobre las virtudes cardinales y teologales enfocadas desde la ética y la antropología, principalmente. El autor es un buen conocedor de la obra de Santo Tomás de Aquino y San Agustín, entre otros, lo que le sirve para fundamentar e iluminar sus reflexiones. Se trata de un estudio denso, pero enriquecedor. Por otro lado, el lenguaje que emplea Josef Pieper es muy accesible. Buen libro.
September 2, 2023
Espectacular libro que resume de manera extraordinaria las virtudes fundamentales a la luz de la fe cristiana, citando a grandes teólogos y filósofos como Aristóteles, Tomás de Aquino, C.S. Lewis entre otros. Me amplió mi visión sobre las virtudes a las que estamos llamados a alcanzar y nos llevan a nuestra plenitud.
April 18, 2021
I read this book for my Intro to Ethics class and I thought it was very informational. Overall, it wasn't terribly enjoyable and it was kind of confusing at times with all of the untranslated Latin, but I also think it's a valuable read.
December 20, 2019
A challenging, but extremely illuminating book that I will return to many times in the future.
December 6, 2020
Best book I've ever read.
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