Although little noticed, the Trump administration just took a significant step toward strengthened military options for possible strikes on Iran’s nuclear program.
It did so via Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s ordering of the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group to relocate from the East China Sea to the Middle East. Hegseth also extended the deployment of the USS Harry S. Truman strike group, operating off Yemen in the Gulf of Aden. A third carrier strike group, the USS Nimitz, is in the Pacific Ocean but could be in the Middle East within three to four weeks of orders. Also noteworthy, a number of B-2 bombers have been deployed from their home base in western Missouri to the United Kingdom’s Diego Garcia island in the Indian Ocean. Those B-2s would be the linchpin of any strikes against Iran’s most heavily defended nuclear facilities.
Put simply, things are heating up.
Much of the media commentary surrounding Carl Vinson’s change of orders has suggested that this is about bolstering U.S. military strikes against the Houthis in Yemen. Led by Truman’s carrier air wing, the United States has engaged in nearly two weeks of air strikes against the Houthis toward ending the group’s missile and drone attacks on cargo ships transiting the Red Sea trade chokepoint. But Carl Vinson’s deployment isn’t ultimately about the Houthis; it’s about Iran.
The diplomatic backdrop is relevant here. The U.S. and Israel are holding Iran nuclear program-related meetings at the White House this week. These meetings follow President Donald Trump’s recent letter to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, offering him a short window to reenter nuclear negotiations or face U.S. military action. But Israel is pushing Trump to launch strikes against Iran now, assessing that while Iran has been weakened by recent Israeli military and intelligence activity, Israel has a low probability of successfully destroying Iran’s nuclear program without U.S. participation.
The urgency of the moment is significant. What will Trump do?
So far, the president has made a positive effort to match increased sanctions on Iran to his push for a new deal on its nuclear program. Getting that deal is a priority because Iran has now stockpiled enough near weapons-grade enriched uranium to produce six nuclear weapons. While Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard confirmed this week that the U.S. does not believe Iran has moved to develop a nuclear weapon, it could likely do so in fewer than six months of an order from Khamenei.
Another complication is that while Trump has adopted a more pragmatic negotiating position than in his first term — in which the U.S. essentially demanded Khamenei suspend his Islamic revolution in return for talks, a nonstarter for the supreme leader — Khamenei now holds a personal animus toward the president over the killing of Iranian general Qassem Soleimani in January 2020. Put simply, the space for diplomatic progress appears in very short supply.
That takes us back to the aircraft carriers. After all, two Carrier Air Wings (a carrier’s embarked air complement) constitute the minimum deployment structure in U.S. military plans to provide defensive air cover in the event of an Israeli or U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program.
Again, this doubled-up presence is not about the Houthis; it’s about Iran.
Pulling a carrier out of the Pacific means losing military deterrence against China, America’s keystone adversary. China has taken advantage of this dynamic in the recent past. At the same time, the Truman carrier strike group has sufficient combat power to deal with the Houthis as far as is practical. It has destroyers armed with land-attack missiles, its carrier air wing has between 40 and 48 F-18 Super Hornet strike fighter jets, and it has support from armed aerial drones operating out of regional bases. But because the Houthis are effective at hiding their forces and dispersing their weapons, the U.S. military likely cannot compel their cessation of attacks. To defeat the Houthis, the U.S. would have to deploy a significant ground force into Yemen, and there is understandably no political appetite for such an operation.
In turn, the current U.S. strategy is designed to degrade the Houthis enough that they decide to hide their forces more than they employ them. Trump may also hope that he will deter other U.S. enemies by taking tougher action against the Houthis than that which the Biden administration took.
Regarding Iran, however, two carriers give the U.S. military significantly improved flexibility.
F-18s operating off Carl Vinson and Truman in the Gulf of Oman could range most nuclear targets inside Iran. Other F-18s could also secure air defense coverage and air supremacy over southern Iran, allowing refueler aircraft operations and fleet protection. Alongside the carrier strike groups’ destroyers, cruisers, and attack submarines, the F-18s could defeat any Iranian attempt to disrupt maritime tanker or cargo traffic in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz.
It also bears noting that VFA-97, one of the fighter squadrons embarked with Carl Vinson’s carrier air wing, is an F-35C squadron. The F-35s have had many teething problems, but assuming they function correctly, those stealth aircraft will provide penetrating air dominance and ground attack capability deep inside Iran. Nor is the professional capability of these naval aviators in question. Numerous members of the Carl Vinson and Truman air wings are graduates of the U.S. Navy Strike Fighter Tactics Instructor Program advanced air combat school. VFA-97’s executive officer is a former TOPGUN instructor, for example. But the basic point here is that two carrier air wings give U.S. military planners 80-94 strike fighter aircraft (supported by two airborne warning and two electronic warfare squadrons) right on Iran’s doorstep.
This is not to say that these operations would be easy or casualty-free. It is simply to say that two carriers and the B-2s in Diego Garcia give the Joint Chiefs of Staff minimum confidence to tell Trump it could do the job alongside other complementing U.S. forces. Movement by these other forces would provide further indications of preparations for an Israeli or a joint U.S.-Israeli attack.
For one, we would expect to see a bolstered deployment of Air Force F-15s and F-16s to Europe and the Middle East. These aircraft would be needed to help intercept any Iranian missiles or drones launched against Israeli, Saudi Arabian (its diplomatic fluff to the contrary, Iran despises Saudi Arabia as its Islamic ideological nemesis and because of its U.S. alliance), or U.S. interests in retaliation to an attack on Iran’s nuclear program. Increased activity by U.S. surveillance drones and aircraft such as the RC-135 signals aircraft would also be expected (these would be employed to generate more accurate targeting information and better anticipate Iranian military planning).
Another clear indicator would be the Nimitz’s deployment to the Middle East. Ramped-up deployments of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and Patriot air defense systems would also be near certain before an attack. The expulsion of Iranian spies operating under diplomatic cover at the United Nations and FBI operations against Iranian, Hamas, and Hezbollah operatives might also occur.
Nevertheless, because Iran would take notice of them, all of these actions could be employed simply for diplomatic pressure purposes. The key indicator of any U.S. attack would probably not be apparent until the first bombs had fallen. That’s because it would involve B-2s employing the GBU-57 massive ordnance penetrator bombs and B-1B bombers employing the GBU-74 advanced penetrator bombs. Those two bombs are designed to destroy heavily fortified structures deep underground. They would almost certainly be required to provide any possibility of destroying the hardened, underground nuclear facilities at Natanz and Fordow in northern Iran (hence why Israel has pressed the U.S. to provide it with these weapons). But one advantage of the B-2s using Diego Garcia rather than their Missouri home base as the launch pad for any attack is the fact that, unlike Missouri, Diego Garcia is a wholly military-occupied island. No one is going to post on social media that they’ve just seen a load of B-2s take off from the middle of the Indian Ocean.
The B-1Bs could be forward deployed to Europe or, as with the B-2s, Diego Garcia before any strikes. However, for diplomatic reasons (allies might be reluctant to host bombers later used to strike Iran) and military reasons (securing the element of surprise), these aircraft could also conduct strikes from their home bases instead of refueling in the air.
Trump, of course, will be the ultimate decider as to whether the U.S. launches strikes on Iran or, by supplying deep penetrating bombs, provides Israel with a means of carrying out those strikes itself. But the deployment of two aircraft carriers to the Middle East is a clear indication that the Pentagon is bolstering its pressure on Iran and its ability to provide short-notice military options to the president.
The Houthis, in other words, are the sideshow.
